This paper evaluates the empirical relationship between top executive turnover and firm performance. Based on a sample of the 460 largest UK listed companies during the period 1990-1998 we establish an inverse and robust statistical relation between the probability of a management change and a firm's performance: top executives are fired for poor performance. This can result from internal monitoring of management by the board or block share holders. Second, the data indicate that only very poor levels of performance affect significantly the turnover likelihood: corporate performance must fall dramatically to force a senior executive job separation. Third, the likelihood of managerial turnover for poor performance has not changed over time: today's senior managers face the same disciplining effects as those senior managers in earlier years. Finally, there seems to be no evidence that managerial stock ownership, measured as the proportion of ordinary shares owned by top managers, enables them to become entrenched.
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses a central corporate governance question: are changes in top management associated with poor company performance? This problem has, of course, been addressed before in the literature and the general empirical conclusion is that a negative association exists between CEO turnover and performance. CEOs are fired for declining stock prices (see the review by Murphy, 1999) . In the US Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) document an inverse relationship between the probability of management turnover and firm performance. Recently, Conyon (1998) and Dahya et al. (2002) also document a negative CEO turnover -corporate performance relation for UK firms.
The contribution of this paper is four-fold. First, we document the top executive turnover and firm performance relation for a panel of hand collected UK data between 1990 and 1998. The existing UK evidence relating to management turnover and performance is comparatively sparse. It typically relies on survey-based data (Conyon, 1998) or focuses on specific industries (Cosh and Hughes, 1997) or performs a less inclusive and comprehensive identification and classification of top executive departures (Dedman, 2000; Dahya et al., 2002) . In contrast, the quality of our hand collected governance data means that for the first time, we can map a higher frequency of changes in the UK top management teams between 1990 and 1998 as well as focus on differences in management change based upon forced and non-forced executive departures. Second, we address the time series heterogeneity of the management turnover and firm performance relation. That is, has the dismissal likelihood for poor performance increased over time in the UK? Existing US findings regarding this effect are limited and contradictory (Mikkelson and Partch, 1997; Murphy, 1999; Huson et al., 2001) . Prior UK research has considered heterogeneity in the CEO dismissal -performance relationship only surrounding the implementation of the Cadbury proposals (Dedman, 2000; Dahya et al., 2002) . The primary focus of the above studies is whether dismissal for poor performance is more likely after 1992.
Moreover, the reported evidence finds conflicting results. We depart from these papers by providing a more general test of how the CEO dismissal and performance relationship has changed over time. In particular, we investigate whether senior executives are more likely to be fired for poor performance today (i.e. in 1994-1997) compared with the past (i.e. in 1991-1993) . In addition, we evaluate the sensitivity of our tests by defining alternative performance windows (e.g. 1991-1992 versus 1993-1997) .
Third, how bad does firm performance really have to be before top executives are replaced? This is unique to the UK literature. Typically, the literature estimates a single (negative) parameter that acts as supporting evidence that CEOs are replaced for poor performance. However, we evaluate whether doing really badly (stock returns in the low deciles -e.g. 10 th ) has different effects on managerial turnover compared to doing really well (stock returns in the high deciles -e.g. 90 th ).
Finally, we provide additional evidence on a controversial issue related to the turnover-performance relation, namely the impact of CEO shareholdings on the internal monitoring efforts. It is sometimes argued that the when the CEO is an important equity holder in the company, then he or she can become potentially entrenched, and his or her shareholdings may prove a stumbling block to those who wish to hasten departure for poor performance (Morck et al., 1988) . The existing evidence relating to the role of equity in the turnover-performance relation is both sparse and mixed.
This study is based on unbalanced panel of the top 460 UK companies over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . Since our main focus is on the relationship between the likelihood of top executive turnover and poor performance, it is important that we use a number of performance metrics in our modelling procedure 1 . Accordingly, firm performance is measured in a number of ways including absolute total shareholder returns, accounting earnings, market-adjusted shareholder returns as well as industryadjusted shareholder returns and accounting earnings. Managerial stock ownership is measured by the fraction of ordinary shares owned by the company's top manager.
Our main contributions to the UK corporate governance literature are as follows. First, there is an inverse and robust relation between the probability of a top management dismissal and firm performance: senior managers are fired for poor performance. Second, top executives are more likely to leave their office today compared with the earlier years. Nevertheless, our results indicate that the correlation between managerial dismissal and company performance has not changed markedly over this time period. There is some slight (but not compelling) evidence that top executive forced turnover rates and stock returns are more negatively correlated over the latter part of the 1990s. Third, we examined how bad performance has to be for senior managers to be fired. Our empirical results indicate that performance has to fall dramatically for top managers to be dismissed. Finally, we addressed the issue of whether managers who hold significant share stakes are able to insulate themselves against dismissal in the event of poor performance. Our empirical results indicate that there is no evidence of managerial entrenchment at high levels of executive stock ownership.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related theoretical background and prior research. Data are described in Section 3. Findings are presented in section 4. Section 5 reports the results of additional robustness tests.
Concluding remarks are made in Section 6.
THEORY AND PRIOR RESEARCH
Managerial discipline can be achieved (and agency costs reduced) by the complementary intervention of both internal and external control mechanisms (Mikkelson and Partch, 1997) 2 . This study investigates the quality of governance mechanisms by focusing on the replacement of the senior management team in response to poor corporate performance
3
. In addition, we examine the incentives facing CEOs who hold large share stakes. It is widely argued that the most important internal governance institutions are the directors' board and large shareholders (Tirole, 2001 ).
The job of the board is to hire, fire and compensate the CEO. Fama (1980: 294) states 'the board is viewed as a market-induced institution, the ultimate internal monitor of the set of contracts called a firm, whose most important role is to scrutinise the highest decision makers within the firm'. Within this context, it is argued that directors increase the value of their human capital, which depends primarily on their 2 External monitoring mechanisms include a) the managerial labour market (Fama, 1980) ; b) product market competition (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958; Hart, 1983) ; c) capital market competition (Jensen, 1991) and; d) the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . 3 Removing a poorly performing manager in companies which do not face immediate external threats (e.g. bankruptcy, take-over) is one of the most observable signals of the internal monitors' performance as internal decision managers in other organisations, by strengthening their reputations as decision control experts (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) .
Nevertheless, several factors suggest that directors will not necessarily act in shareholder interests. For example, outside directors may owe their positions to management who proposed them in the first place (Hart, 1995) . Secondly interlocking and multiple directorships may reduce the effectiveness of outside directors (Patton and Baker, 1987; Hart, 1995) . Finally, directors may not own a substantial fraction of the company equity and therefore may have little to gain personally from improvements in company performance (Jensen, 1993; Hart, 1995) .
Another significant internal control mechanism is monitoring by holders of large share blocks. Large shareholders have incentives to replace inefficient managers in order to improve company performance; they have both a general interest in profit maximisation and enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interests respected (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . By owing a large enough stake in the company, major shareholders find it profitable to monitor top management; the large shareholders' return on their own shares suffices to cover their monitoring costs. Moreover, not only they have the incentive to exercise control but also the power to activate it through their voting rights.
Nevertheless, the efficacy of large shareholders should not be taken for granted, since this is intimately tied to their ability to defend their rights, which in turn depends on the sophistication of the underlying legal system (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Another possibility is that large investors would agree to leave the management alone, in exchange for having their shares repurchased at a premium (Hart, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Finally, in the case where the large effectiveness. Yet, managerial dismissal can still be partly influenced by external factors (e.g. capital market competition).
shareholder is an institution, it is not clear whether the institution's manager -who acts on its behalf -will properly monitor the company as opposed to serve his own interests (Hart, 1995) .
If, despite the caveats we have raised above, the internal monitoring mechanisms are effective; and if firm financial performance reflects managerial performance, there should be a negative relation between the probability of a top management change and corporate performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) .
A related concern is the impact of executive equity ownership on the internal monitoring efforts. Ownership of the firm's shares by its managers has countervailing effects: an incentive alignment effect that increases with the percentage of share value owned by the manager (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and an entrenchment effect that increases with the percentage of shares votes controlled by managers (Demsetz, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; Stulz, 1988) . Moreover, managerial ownership may inhibit the external corporate control market and therefore reduce the effectiveness of internal monitoring efforts (Denis et al., 1997) . In general, the entrenchment effect dictates that top managers with a substantial stake in their companies are relatively hard to remove, even in poorly performing companies.
In general, there is a well-documented negative relation between firm performance and the probability of top executive turnover (e.g. Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, Weisbach, 1988; Warner et al., 1988; Parrino, 1997; Huson et al., 2001 for US evidence) 4 . In the UK, Dedman (2000) and Dahya et al. (2002) are two recent studies on executive turnover 5 . This paper distinguishes itself from the above studies in four ways. First, we map executive departures by focusing on the identity of 4 Other US studies in this topic include Harrison et al. (1988) ; Gilson (1989) ; Barro and Barro (1990) ; Jensen and Murphy (1990) . Murphy (1999) provides a very good and recent review of empirical evidence on management turnover. 5 Earlier UK studies on executive turnover include Conyon (1998) and Conyon and Nicolitsas (1998 Dahya et al.) . This is of particular importance in the UK, since the title "Chief Executive Officer" has only comparatively recently been used to denote the top corporate position. As a result, this study more accurately identifies the company's leading executive and captures a higher frequency of top management departures than prior work. Secondly, due to the quality of the data, our study performs a detailed analysis of all types of executive departures (including the retirements) and hence uses a much less noisy measure of forced departures than prior work (including the US studies). Thirdly, we examine the poor -performance hypothesis across different levels of firm performance. Finally, we investigate the effect of the temporal shifts in the general economic environment on the disciplining of inefficient managers. In contrast, both Dedman (2000) and Dahya et al. (2002) focus on the specific impact of the Cadbury Report's recommendations on the turnover-performance association.
The entrenchment effect of managerial stock ownership remains controversial. Weisbach (1988) , for example, finds no evidence that CEO shareholdings reduce the likelihood of turnover. In contrast, Denis et al. (1997) , document that turnover is significantly less sensitive to performance at high managerial ownership levels while Dahya et al. (1998) conclude that managerial entrenchment effects occur at extremely low ownership levels (e.g. one percent) 6 . This paper contributes to the above debate by providing additional evidence on the entrenchment hypothesis where the share ownership variable consists of the ordinary holdings of only the top executive and not of all officers and directors.
6 See also Allen and Panian (1982) , Morck et al. (1989) , Dedman (2000) .
METHODOLOGY Sample Selection Procedure
This study is based on a sample of the top 460 UK companies listed on the London stock market over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . The companies are selected as follows.
Using Datastream and excluding all investment trusts and the repetitions of those firms that have two classes of shares listing on the London Stock Exchange (e.g. B or
Non-Voting shares), the largest 300 UK companies ranked by market capitalisation on 1 st January each year are selected. In each of the separate years over 1990 to 1998 the largest 300 companies will, of course, change as some companies exit the list (e.g. through takeover, death or decline in capitalization) and other firms enter.
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that once a company enters the top 300 list at some point during the 1990-1998 period, it stays in the sample for the entire period as long as it continues to be listed on the London Stock Exchange and irrespective of its market value. So, for example, if company A becomes one of the top 300 UK firms in 1994, information for it is entered for all the years -before and after 1994 -during which it is listed, and even though it may drop out the top 300 list due to a decline in its market capitalisation. Hence, companies leave the sample only when they become de-listed because of take-over, bankruptcy etc. 7 A company's return index shows the growth in the share value and the value of the dividends. The relevant formula is: RI = RI t * (P t + D t )/P t-1 , where P t = price on ex-date (i.e. the day dividend payments become certain), P t-1 = price on previous day and D t = dividend payment associated with exdate t.
Identifying the Most Senior Executive Changes
Identifying the most senior company executive in UK firms, as noted above, is a 
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable in this study is the change in the Most Senior In total there are 318 MSE changes. Of these changes 3 (0.9%) are not mentioned in any of the above sources while 11 changes (3.4%) are reported either in the FT Archive or the Extel Announcements or the Company Accounts but the information given is limited. As expected the most commonly reported reason is retirement; 100 cases (31.4%). Interestingly, only one company reports that it sacked its manager.
Identifying Forced/Non-forced Departures
Termination of top manager's employment is more likely to be a response to poor management performance than are management changes in general. Consequently, the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms can be assessed by comparing forced departures with non-forced departures. Unfortunately, as discussed in Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Weisbach (1988) , identification of forced departures can be very difficult because companies do not announce the true reason behind their managers' resignations. For example, a stated retirement may really be a forced departure. However, if a press report does indicate that a management change is executive chairman. In all three cases, top managers agreed to take a role with a lot less responsibilities whereas a new CEO joined the company.
forced (i.e. CEO was ousted by the boardroom) one can be reasonably confident that the change is indeed forced.
We construct the forced and non-forced samples using the following decision process: First, we classify as either non-forced or forced all the departures for which we are able to corroborate the cause independently. Hence, executive changes due to normal succession, death/illness and, merger/de-merger are classed as non-forced departures; changes because of poor performance, policy or personality disagreement and scandals are classed as forced departures. In all these cases, no inconsistencies between company announcements and press releases are observed. For 19 departures, no reason is reported; similar to previous studies these departures are also classified as forced (Weisbach, 1988; Warner et al., 1988) . In contrast with previous studies that regard all retirements as routine departures, we perform a detailed analysis of this type of change as well. Of critical importance in this analysis is the age of the retiring manager. The mean age of executives described as retiring (a total of 192 observations) is 63 which is the age commonly used in retirement policies. Departees not described as retiring are generally younger; their mean age is 53.7 (a total of 295 observations). Moreover, the p value of the t-statistic for the difference in mean ages of retirees and other departees is 0.00. Consequently, all retiring managers with ages above 63 should be excluded from the forced sample, while all retiring managers with ages below 63 should be included in the forced sample.
However, the classification of retirements into forced and non-forced based on the age variable and only could lead to wrong conclusions. This is why in our analysis we consider not only the age of the departing manager but also: a) the circumstances of the change, b) the destination of the departing manager, and c) the time period between the announcement and leave date. The following two examples illustrate the above point: a) C. Stein, chairman and MD of Hilton group, retired at the age of 65. If we accept that a normal retirement age is around 63, then this should be a non-forced one. However, C. Stein was forced to retire, following the investors' dissatisfaction with the company's performance. In addition his retirement was announced in September 1993, only 3 months before he actually left the group; b) P. Dodd, CEO of Alliance Unichem, retired at the age of 55. If we accept that a normal retirement age is around 63, then this should be a forced one. However, FT articles reveal that this was actually a non-forced and very amicable retirement.
Finally, there are eleven cases for which only limited information is provided.
We classify all of these as forced. Since there is a fairly high possibility of misclassification for such cases, we also investigate the sensitivity of turnover to performance after excluding these observations from our analysis. This is further discussed in section 5.
The above process results in a total of 135 MSE forced departures and 180 MSE non-forced ones (a total of 315 observations) 9 . Given that executive dismissals are a relatively rare corporate event (Furtado and Karan, 1990) , the lower incidence of forced departures (43% of the total changes) compared with non-forced departures (57% of the total changes) could be interpreted as evidence of proper classification of MSE turnover. The number of all Most Senior Executive changes, forced and nonforced changes per year and per company is presented in Table 1 .
Compared to the rest of the sample years, 1990 and 1998 have lower turnover rates, since these years do not represent a full twelve-month period (i.e. January to December 
Independent Variables
Two measures of company performance are used in this study; company stock prices and accounting earnings. As already explained, the return on the company's stock (SHR) is calculated as the log of (RI t+1 /RI t ), where RI stands for Return Index on 1 st January. In an efficient market, however, stock prices anticipate the future benefits of the possibility of CEO dismissal and therefore tend to increase as the capital market becomes aware of new avenues for management improvement. As a result, they may under-estimate the monitoring role of internal disciplining devices. Accounting-based measures, on the other hand, are more stable and are not vulnerable to speculative or exogenous shocks (although a counter argument could be that accounting-based measures are endogenous and susceptible to managerial manipulation) 11 . Accounting earnings may, therefore, play a significant role in the process of internal governance of companies. Company accounting returns are calculated as the level of accounting earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) standardised by the book value of the firm's total assets in the beginning of the year to control for size differences. Size is operationalised as the log of the market value of the company. The above data is obtained from Datastream.
In addition to the company's own performance measures, the study tests the Table 3 .
[INSERT 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS Empirical Specification
The following Probit model is estimated where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance:
The term x i β is the probit score, where x contains forcing variables and β is the population vector to be estimated by maximum likelihood methods. The term y is an indicator variable relating to the probability of top management departure. Probit regressions are estimated using three definitions of a management change: a) all MSE changes, b) forced MSE changes, and c) non-forced MSE changes 12 . A zero (0) indicates a negative outcome, whereas a one (1) represents a positive outcome, i.e. if the senior executive is not disclosed in the firm's top management team in year t+1.
earnings losses or declines. 12 An alternative approach would be to estimate a multinomial logit regression with three turnover outcomes: 0=no change, 1=forced change and 2=non-forced change. Comparing the two models, we found that results are qualitatively identical.
The X matrix contains proxies for stock-based and accounting-based company performance and managerial stock ownership. Also included are measures of firm size and managerial age, as several studies argue that company size and CEO age are potentially important predictors of the turnover possibility (Warner et al., 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . In addition, all probit models include specific industry and time effects.
The Turnover-Performance Relation
In this section we evaluate the impact of stock-based and accounting-based performance on the likelihood of a top management change. Table 4 presents our basic probit estimation results on the relation between top management turnover and performance measures. To put our results in economic perspective, the marginal effects rather than the coefficient estimates of the probit model are presented. The derivative of the probability of turnover with respect to a particular regressor illustrates the marginal effect of this regressor (Greene, 2000) . Since the marginal effects will vary with the values of x we calculate marginal effects at the mean values of all the variables (Greene, 2000) .
[
INSERT TABLE 4]
Consistent with prior research both in the US and the UK (e.g. Parrino, 1997; Conyon, 1998) , poor firm performance increases the probability of executive turnover. In Model (1) we present estimates where we include two lags of own stock return as the independent variables. The marginal increase in the probability of executive turnover and forced turnover for a marginal decrease in stock performance is 0.081 and 0.053, respectively; both estimates are significant at the 1% level. Lag two of stock return is insignificant for both the all changes and forced changes specifications.
In Model (2) we include two lags of EBIT as additional performance variables.
The . Finally, the inclusion of accounting earnings in Model (2) does not alter the effect of the prior year returns variable which remains negative and significant under both all changes and forced changes.
As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of the internal control mechanisms can be assessed by comparing forced departures with non-forced departures. The estimates of all performance measures in the non-forced turnover models in columns 3 and 6 reveal that, in contrast with forced top executive changes, there is no evidence of significant relation between the likelihood of non-forced departure and performance. Instead non-forced departures are driven mainly by the age variable which enters with a positive sign (0.003) and is significant at 1% level.
Up to now the models have only included lagged measures of firm performance. However, executive turnover events may also be associated with contemporaneous performance. For example, the recent executive changes at Marconi might suggest that they were a direct result of current period's performance than that in the previous one or two years. To test this, we re-estimate Model (2) from Table 4 including current stock returns, beginning on 1 st January and running up to a month prior to the announcement of the departure. Our results are qualitatively unchanged.
For example, the marginal effect of current year's share performance on the likelihood of forced departures is -0.043 and significant at less than the 1% level while the estimates of lagged performance measures are broadly consistent with those previously reported.
An alternative to the probit specification would be to use a logit specification.
From a theoretical perspective, it is difficult to justify the choice of one formulation over the other (Greene, 2000) . Overall, the two approaches are quite comparable, the main difference being that the logit formulation has slighter flatter tails. To check that our turnover-performance results are not simply an artefact of the probit estimation technique, we re-estimate Model (2) of Table 4 using a logit estimation procedure and find very similar results. For example, the marginal effect of prior year's stock performance and accounting returns on forced MSE turnover is -0.049 and -0.135 respectively; both estimates are significant at the 1% level 14 . Again, the data reveal no association between non-forced departures and firm performance.
The Turnover Likelihood over Ranges of Corporate Performance
The impact of firm performance on executive changes is further explored by investigating whether different levels of performance have a different effect on top 14 The marginal impact of variable X 1 for the logit model is calculated as: ∂Turnover/∂ X 1 =β 1 *(1-p)*p, where p is the observed forced MSE turnover rate and β 1 is the logit coefficient estimate of X 1 . In results not reported here, it is found that β equals -1.359 and -3.704 for SHR t-1 and EBIT t-1 respectively whilst p equals 0.038. management turnover. In particular, we assign each firm to a decile based on the full nine-year period SHR t-1 and EBIT t-1 . Within its decile, the mean actual turnover rate of all types of Most Senior Executive changes (i.e. all changes, forced changes and non-forced changes) is calculated. In addition, we perform more rigorous econometric exploration. First, we calculate the implied probabilities of MSE turnover based on the probit estimates from the complete Model (2) in Table 4 . The probabilities for all changes are computed using column 4, the probabilities for forced changes are computed using column 5 and the probabilities for non-forced changes are computed using column 6. We then sort these probabilities into the performance deciles. Finally, implied probabilities are averaged within each decile.
Actual and predicted turnover rates by decile are presented in Table 5 ; panels A and B contain the results for stock returns and accounting returns respectively.
Mean own stock return for the previous year (SHR t-1 ) ranges from -0.671 in the bottom decile (1) to 0.660 in the top decile (10). Mean accounting earnings for the previous year (EBIT t-1 ) range from -0.078 in the bottom decile (1) to 0.346 in the top decile (10). As shown, the frequency of all MSE departures and forced MSE departures declines significantly from the bottom performance decile to the top performance decile under both performance measures. In contrast, the frequency of non-forced turnover does not vary significantly across different performance deciles.
Descriptive results, therefore, suggest that only very poor levels of performance affect the turnover rate and in particular, the dismissal rate.
Consistent with the unconditional frequencies, predicted probabilities of turnover also reveal that unless performance is very poor the turnover possibility is not significantly high. When performance is measured by prior year own stock return, the mean predicted turnover rate declines from 0.186 for the group of worst changes whereas predicted probabilities of non-forced turnover are relatively constant across different performance deciles. Overall, these probability estimates suggest that internal control mechanisms seem to be effective in monitoring and replacing inefficient managers; performance levels however, need to be very poor for internal monitors to take disciplinary action.
INSERT TABLE 5]
The Turnover-Performance Relation over Time
The specification in Table 4 assumes that the relation between management turnover and performance is the same for the entire period 1990-1998. However, the sensitivity of turnover to performance may vary across different time periods. Some prior UK work has addressed this issue and concentrates on the impact of the Cadbury Report's recommendations (Dedman 2000; Dahya et al. 2002) . These papers divide the sample into two periods: before and after 1992. The turnover-performance relation is then estimated for each sub-sample. However, sub-samples contain two contrasting periods of general economic performance in the UK: the pre-Cadbury window is associated with a recessionary period and the post-Cadbury period is associated with higher growth and improved economic performance. Moreover, both of the studies yield inconclusive results on the temporal stability of the management turnoverperformance relation.
Accordingly, we depart from these papers by providing a broader test of the time effect on the sensitivity of turnover to performance. namely, 1991-1992 versus 1993-1997 . Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. As shown, we find that executive turnover is negatively and significantly correlated with both stock-based and accounting-based performance only during the period 1994 -1997 . In particular, during 1994 -1997 The above evidence, combined with the fact that there is no particular timeseries pattern in the actual CEO turnover rates by year (see Table 1 ), suggests that CEOs are not more likely to be dismissed for poor performance. That is, the disciplining effect of poor performance for this sample of companies and this time period has not become stronger over time.
[ INSERT TABLE 6] This is consistent with US evidence reported by Huson et al. (2001) but in contrast with that of Mikkelson and Partch (1997) and Murphy (1999) . Specifically, Huson et al. (2001) suggest that internal governance structures are equally effective in removing poorly performing CEOs across four sub-periods; 1971-1976, 1977-1982, 1983-1988, and 1989-1994 . In contrast with the above, Mikkelson and Partch (1997) and Murphy (1999) The results established so far complement previous UK papers (Dedman 2000; Dahya et al. 2002) . But, to provide further comparability between our paper and the above studies we split the observations into two separate windows: 1991-1992 and 1993-1997 . We then re-estimate the models in Table 6 . This analysis indicates that for forced MSE changes, the marginal effect of prior year stock returns is more negative in 1993-1997 than in 1991-1992 (i.e. -0.049 and -0.031 respectively).
Moreover, the marginal effect of prior year accounting earnings is less negative in 1993-1997 than in 1991-1992 (i.e. -0.127 and -0.257 respectively) . In both cases, however, the difference in the estimates is statistically insignificant indicating that the disciplining effect has not changed following the Cadbury Report. The above results are broadly similar to those of Dedman (2000) and Dahya et al. (2002) who also fail to report evidence of a stronger turnover-performance relation following the publication of the Cadbury code 16 . Nevertheless, a direct comparison is not possible, as findings are highly dependent on the empirical framework adopted 17 .
Finally, it is worth commenting on the robustness of the study's findings. More specifically, the results remain broadly the same irrespective of the partitioning strategy. That is, we find that the disciplining effect of top executives has not strengthened over the time even if the sample is split into 1991-1994 and 1995-1997 .
Executive Stock Ownership and Turnover
A related issue is that executive shareholdings may have consequences for the likelihood of CEO turnover. Large equity ownership can insulate top executives from internal monitoring efforts either through the voting control with which it is associated or through the correlation between equity ownership and other conditions conducive to managerial entrenchment, such as status within the firm (Morck et al., 1988) . In general, managerial ownership may make it more difficult to remove a manager from office. In this section we test the impact of managerial stock ownership on the turnover likelihood, by adding to the baseline probit equations (see Table 4 ) the STAKE variable.
Columns 1-3 of Table 7 report the marginal effects of the regression of turnover on stock ownership under all changes, forced changes and non-forced changes. As shown, a one unit increase in managerial stock ownership decreases the 16 In particular, Dedman (2000) finds that the disciplining effect has not changed following the Cadbury Report when performance is measured by accounting earnings whilst results regarding the turnover-performance relation are inconclusive when performance is measured by stock returns. Dahya et al. (2002) report a stronger turnover-performance following the publication of the Cadbury Code but this effect is not robust (i.e. it disappears when they incorporate additional explanatory variables).
likelihood of executive turnover by 0.27, the forced change possibility by 0.09 and the non-forced departure probability by 0.16; estimates are significant at 1% and 5%.
Prior year share performance and accounting performance measures remain negative and significant for both all changes and forced departures. The results suggest that although stock ownership may serve to align the interests between shareholders and managers, it is also negatively related to CEO turnover.
However, the interpretation of this negative correlation between CEO turnover and equity stakes is open to two competing explanations. On the one hand high ownership stakes entrench management and make it difficult for the corporate board to remove them. This is the entrenchment view. On the other hand large equity stakes reduce agency costs and so we would expect to see less turnover in companies where the CEO holds a significant equity stake. In other words, the higher the managerial stock ownership the lower the need for disciplining top managers, as they themselves become shareholders and are penalised by the declining value of their wealth.
The real point is whether senior executives are less likely to be fired for poor corporate performance when they have a significant share stake. We discriminate between the two views by evaluating the turnover-performance relation in two subsamples. Specifically, we interact both prior year stock returns and accounting returns with an indicator variable (D Median ) that takes the value one (1) if MSE stock ownership is above the median (i.e. 0.0003) and zero (0) otherwise. If managers do become entrenched at high levels of stock ownership we should expect to see a less negative effect of performance on turnover when equity ownership is above the median, i.e. we should expect to see a positive estimate on the interaction terms.
Columns 4-6 in Table 7 present the marginal effects of the interaction term of D Median with lagged share performance and accounting performance. As shown, under all and non-forced turnover the estimates of the interaction variables are not only insignificant but also display the opposite sign of that predicted (with the exception of the estimate of D Median *EBIT t-1 ). Similarly, when the dependent variable is forced MSE turnover, the interaction term with prior year share performance is both economically and statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the marginal effect of previous year accounting earnings is more negative (and significant at the 10% level)
if MSE stock ownership is above than below the median (-0.142 = -0.043 -0.099 as opposed to -0.043). Overall, therefore we conclude that there is no strong evidence supporting the claim of managerial entrenchment in companies with high levels of equity stake owned by top managers.
[ INSERT TABLE 7] The results are broadly in line with the conclusions reached by Dahya et al. (1998) who, based on UK data report that there is no evidence of managerial entrenchment effects at high ownership levels (e.g. above 5%). They do, however, document evidence of an entrenchment effect at low ownership levels (e.g. below 1%). In order to increase the results' comparability we replicate their analysis. More specifically, we classify all observations into three managerial stock ownership categories: a) below or equal to 1%, b) between 1% and 5% and, c) above or equal to 5%. Then we re-run Model (2) in Table 4 by including two of the above categorical ownership variables (i.e. a and c) as well as their interaction terms with prior year stock returns. Results (not tabulated here), indicate that none of the above estimates is significant at conventional levels. Again, all and forced departures are inversely and significantly associated with prior year firm performance whereas there is no such association in the case of non-forced MSE changes. Hence, in contrast to Dahya et al. (1998) , we find no evidence that CEOs become entrenched at low ownership levels 18 .
ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS
In this section we report additional tests that assess the robustness of our baseline results. All models provide standard errors that have a stationary covariance matrix.
This adjustment is made using the White (1980) method. Results, however, could be biased for at least two reasons: a) misclassification of top executive changes and b) the use of prior year stock returns and accounting earnings as the appropriate performance measures.
Misclassification of Executive Changes
As already mentioned in section 3, there are eleven cases of executive changes for which information provided is limited. Consequently, it may be the case that we have misclassified these changes as forced. We re-run Model (2) of Table 4 
Alternative Measures of Performance
We test the robustness of our findings by using alternative performance measures. As Cyert and March (1963) argue, firms do not only use their own prior performance in deciding whether or not to replace top executives; they also incorporate the performance of competing firms. Therefore, if the firm's performance is appreciably lower than that of several competitors, the company will replace its top manager more readily than would be the case if the firm was performing similarly to its competitors.
We explore the above by using relative performance measures. These include:
a) prior year market-adjusted stock return, b) prior year industry-adjusted stock return, and c) prior year industry-adjusted accounting earnings. We re-run Model (2) of Table   4 using these alternative performance measures. Results are qualitatively identical under all alternative performance benchmarks. Lag one of market-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock returns, as well as industry-adjusted accounting earnings, is negative and significant in all changes and forced departures. Lag two of returns and earnings are not significant. Again, there is no association between firm performance and non-forced departures, which are driven mainly by age. Finally, none of these measures provide additional explanatory power over results presented in Table 4 .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has examined top executive turnover in a sample of the top 460 UK companies over the period 1990-1998. Our empirical results are based on handcollected data over a whole decade such that we can discriminate between forced and non-forced departures. The size and quality of the sample allows us to provide a more powerful test of the turnover-performance association.
Our main contributions are to extend the management turnover-performance governance literature in the following ways. First, we considered the top executive turnover performance relation and the ranges over which performance had to fall to trigger a senior management turnover. Consistent with previous studies both in the US and the UK, the econometric evidence reveals a robust inverse relation between top executive turnover and pre-dated firm performance: senior managers are dismissed (replaced) for poor performance. Our results suggest that directors use shareholder returns in monitoring and disciplining top managers whilst financial accounting information may also play an important role in the process of internal governance. We found that the likelihood of dismissal for poor performance was only evidenced in companies where there was a forced change. Routine or non-forced changes had no relation to corporate performance.
Second, we examined the range over which top executive turnover and performance extended. We found that an actual executive forced turnover rate in the median deciles of stock performance was about 3%. For poor performance, representing returns of negative 67% to stockholders, the turnover rate was about 13%. It seems that performance must fall considerably to significantly increase the actual management dismissal rate. These results were also confirmed within our econometric results.
Third, we examined the time series heterogeneity in the top executive turnover performance relationship. In particular, we were interested in whether the turnover and corporate performance relation had become more negative over time. This could come about due to increased demands on managerial performance as a result of the intense product market and CEO competition and the significant growth of CEO compensation. However, the results of empirical analysis failed to identify any strong evidence of a change in the performance relation between 1991 to 1993 and 1994 to 1997. It would appear that the disciplining effect has not become stronger over time.
Finally, we examined the effects of share stakes in the management turnover process. We found that there was a negative correlation between executive turnover and management equity holdings. On the one hand this might represent entrenchment, the ability of managers to resist a job separation, due to their ownership stake. On the other hand it may reflect reduced agency costs and less of a need to remove managers in companies where they have a large equity stake. The real point though is whether senior executives are replaced for poor corporate performance. We found that the turnover -performance relation was no different in firms where the top executive had a high equity stake compared with the firms where the equity share stake was low. In consequence, there is no strong evidence suggesting that managers become entrenched at high levels of equity ownership.
Overall, this paper adds to the governance literature by documenting the circumstances under which poor performance can lead to a top management job separation. In summary, we found that corporate performance has to be particularly bad to force a managerial job-separation. There is little evidence that managers are disciplined more for poor corporate performance today than in the earlier years. And finally, top executives with large equity stakes are as likely to be fired for poor performance as those with low equity stakes. 
NOTES:
1. SHR t-1 : Company shareholder return during year t-1 2. EBIT t-1 : Accounting earnings before interest and taxes standardised by the book value of total assets in year t-1 3. Decile 1 stands for the worst performers whereas decile 10 stands for the best performers 4. Mean probabilities of Most Senior Executive all, forced and non-forced changes are computed using probit estimates from the complete Model (2), Table (4), columns (4), (5) and (6) respectively. 5. ATR: Actual turnover rate; PTR: Predicted turnover rate Table 6 Marginal effects of probit models relating Most Senior Executive turnover to stockbased and accounting-based performance over time, time-period: 1991-1997 Table 7 Marginal effects of probit models predicting the relation between MSE turnover and stock ownership as well as the intervening effect of stock ownership on the turnoverperformance association, time-period: 1990-1998 
1. SHR t-1 : Company shareholder return during year t-1 2. SHR t-2 : Company shareholder return during year t-2 3. EBIT t-1 : Accounting earnings before interest and taxes standardised by the book value of total assets in year t-1 4. EBIT t-2 : Accounting earnings before interest and taxes standardised by the book value of total assets in year t-2 5. SIZE: Log of the market value 6. AGE: Most Senior Executive age 7. STAKE: The fraction of ordinary stocks owned by the company's Most Senior Executive. 8. D Median is a dummy indicator equal to one (1) if STAKE is above the median value (i.e. 0.0003) and zero (0) otherwise.
